École Nationale Supérieure de
Techniques Avancées

Abstract

Designing good incentive mechanisms for electric vehicles is an important challenge nowadays. In fact, this new type of vehicle influences several parts of society, at the transport level through congestion/pollution and at the energy level. In this work, we consider the design of driving and charging optimal incentive through a routing game approach with multiple classes of vehicles: gasoline and electric. We show that the game is not standard and needs a particular framework. We are able to prove the existence of a Wardrop equilibrium of this routing game with nonseparable costs, due to interactions through the energy cost. Our analysis is applied to a particular transportation network in which two paths are possible for vehicles, mainly one through the city center and another one outside. In this simple setting, a fully characterization of Wardrop equilibrium is proposed and optimal tolls are computed in order to minimize an environmental cost. Numerical results are provided on real data of electricity consumptions in France and in Texas, USA.